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NOTES
CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES: HOLDER WHO FAILS
TO CONVERT BEFORE EXPIRATION
OF THE CONVERSION PERIOD
During a four-month period in 1967, the conversion rights of
holders of convertible securities having a face value of $1,313,000
were terminated by redemptions. Since the stock into which these
securities could have been converted had a market value of well over
three million dollars, the holders suffered a loss in excess of $1,700,000.1
The greater part of this loss probably fell on individual rather than
institutional investors. 2 The increasing popularity of convertible issues3
makes it likely, if current redemption procedures are continued, that
even greater losses will be sustained in the future.
Losses resulting from a failure to convert before redemption should
not be regarded as an inevitable product of the investment process. The
investor who suffers a loss because his stock depreciates has misjudged
the market; his loss is of the essence of investment. But the holder of a
convertible security who, because of redemption, loses the right to con-
vert into stock worth considerably more than the security's face value
suffers a loss of a different nature; his loss is brought about not by mis-
judgment but by failure to read a newspaper or to be at home to receive
a letter. It results from unsatisfactory investment procedures, not from
risks inherent in investment.
1 Data compiled from a memorandum prepared for the SEC, on file in the Cornell
Law Library. Had these holders made the conversion and sold the stock, the market
might have been depressed, so that the indicated value could not have been realized.
Adjustment must also be made for the small premium paid upon redemption. Still, the
figures given should be substantially correct.
2 The convertible securities market differs from the market for other corporate debt
securities in that it is composed primarily of individuals. Kelly, Basic Structure of the
Corporate Bond Market, 194 Com. & FIN. CHRON. 271, 292, col. 4 (1961); Levy, Arbitrage,
Convertible Bonds, and the Investor, 194 Com. & FIN. CHRON. 278, col. 4 (1961).
3 Finn, Mergers and Convertibles Stimulate Wall Street, 206 Com. & FrN. CHRON.,
Oct. 26, 1967, § 2, at 8; Jones, Hoogovens to Peckiney: Convertible Bonds are Winning
New Favor in the European Market, BARaON'S, March 1, 1965, at 5. On the attractiveness
of convertibles to corporation and investor alike, see 1 A. DEWING, THE FiNANcAL PoUcY oF
CORPORAnoNs 268-71 (5th ed. 1953); H. GUTHUANN & H. DOUGALL, CoRPoRATE FINANCiAL
PoLicY 85-86, 146-47 (3d ed. 1955); Convertible Bonds-Two-way Attraction, FIN. WosLD,
Feb. 9, 1966, at 4; Levy, supra note 2; Mendes, Convertible Debentures and Stock Options,
206 COM. & FIN. CHRON. 442 (1967).
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I
THE HOLDER'S LEGAL REMEDIES: CONSEQUENCES
OF AN ADHESION CONTRACT
A convertible bond or debenture is a contract between the issuer
and the holder.4 One commentator argued, "The conversion privilege,
being solely a matter of contract, may have such limitations and restric-
tions as the parties thereto may desire."5 However, this apparent sug-
gestion that redemption and conversion terms of any sort are enforce-
able is incorrect. Courts have recognized that some terms of standardized
contracts between parties of disparate bargaining power-contracts of
adhesion 6-should not be enforced.7
One court has defined an adhesion contract as follows:
[A] contract entered into between two parties of unequal bargaining
strength, expressed in the language of a standardized contract,
written by the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs, and
offered to the weaker party on a "take it or leave it" basis .... s
The contract between the issuer and the holder of a convertible
security is an adhesion contract. The certificate and the indenture (the
latter may be incorporated by reference into the certificate) are drafted
by the issuer, the trustee, and the underwriter with their own interests
in view.9 The individual purchaser has no opportunity to bargain with
the drafters, since the securities are offered to the public on a mass basis.
Even if there were such an opportunity, the drafters enjoy a much
stronger bargaining position.1° The investor's only choice is to buy or
not buy.
4 Buchman v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 250 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
5 Hills, Convertible Securities-Legal Aspects and Draftsmanship, 19 CALIr. L. REv.
1, 15 (1930).
6 The term was apparently introduced into American legal literature by Professor
Patterson. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUm. L. Rxv. 629, 639 n.11 (1943); see Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance
Policy, 33 HAav. L. Rv. 198, 222 & n.106 (1919).
7 See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal, 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr.
172 (1962); Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 CoLum. L.
Rxv. 833, 858 (1964).
8 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269, 419 P.2d 168, 171, 4 Cal. Rptr. 104,
107 (1966).
9 Comment, Protection for Debenture Holders, 46 YALE L.J. 97, 98 (1936).
10 Mhe supposition is that the indenture evidences the intent of the security
holders whose loans it secures. But that mutuality of intent which is assumed is in
fact non-existent. To the extent that the indenture is the product of the borrower,
the underwriter or the trustee, only their respective intents axe reflected therein.
It is no refutation of this to say that by voluntary ptsrchase of his bonds, debehi-
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Because he is party to an adhesion contract, the holder whose right
to convert has been terminated by redemption has at least two possible
theories of recovery against the issuer. The first attacks the right of the
issuer to terminate the conversion right, and the second attacks the
sufficiency of the process by which termination is effected.
A. Termination of the Conversion Right: Enforcing the Holder's
Reasonable Expectations
The right to convert into stock is central to the bargain between
the holder and the issuer of a convertible security. Convertibles offer
fixed interest rates and, if secured or offered by a corporation with a
high credit rating, security, but these features alone would not attract
investors; they can be obtained on better terms in other types of
securities. Only the right to convert at an advantageous rate makes
these relatively inferior terms acceptable. Thus, investment magazines
advise purchasing the convertibles of certain companies because "each
, , . is favorably situated for the longer term. That's important, for
unless the stock has appreciation potential it hardly pays to buy the
bond."-"
Because the conversion right was a major inducement to the pur-
chase and because it is so important in determining the security's value,
the holder of a convertible might well believe that it lasts for the
stated life of the security.12 This belief is confirmed by a title such as
"4 1/2% Convertible Subordinated Debentures, Due 1981."'1 The in-
vestor in convertible securities is usually an individual'4 who is un-
tures or notes, the security holder accepts just so much as is given and no more.
The individual purchaser of such security cannot normally bargain for special
provisions. Nor can prospective buyers normally unite in anticipation of an issue,
to exact desired terms. nequality of bargaining power between investor and issuer
is inherent in the very technique of security distribution.
SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF TnE WoRK, AcrIvITIEs, PERSONNEL AND
FUNcrTONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION CoMrTm-Es pt. VI, at 5 (1936).
11 Convertible Bonds for Investment, Fin. WoRLD, Jan. 11, 1967, at 5.
12 Most convertible issues have maturities of from 15 to 25 years. Kelly, supra note
2, at 292, col. 2.
1a The New York Stock Exchange recognizes that an inaccurate title can misinform
the investor. Nmv Yom STOCK EXCHANGE, CoMPANY MANUAL § A12(I), Securities Having
Limited Conversion Rights, provides:
In the case of a security having a right of conversion which is not exercisable
through the entire life of the security, the word "convertible" shall not be used
as part of the formal title of the security. Instead, attention shall be called to the
conversion right by means of a sub-heading, such as "Convertible on or before. .
or "Convertible on or after . ... "
Id. at A-217 (1966). Presumably this section does not apply to a security convertible through
its entire life unless called.
.4 See note 2 supra.
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familiar with corporate financial practices; 15 it is unrealistic to assume
that he knows both that the issue is subject to redemption and that
redemption terminates the right to convert. Indeed, the substantial
losses sustained by failure to convert before the expiration of the con-
version period discredit any such assumption.1 6 It is probable that many
investors who have lost the right to convert entered the transaction
with a misunderstanding of its terms.
If the holder has purchased a convertible security with the mis-
taken idea that it is convertible until the stated maturity, he will
probably not be disabused. Although any one of three documents con-
nected with the transaction-the indenture, the prospectus, and the
certificate-might supply the needed information, the investor prob-
ably will see only one of these. The indenture almost certainly will not
be seen.' 7 The prospectus will not normally be seen unless the security
is bought as a new issue. Even if the prospectus for an older issue is
available to the purchaser, it may not say that the right of conversion
is terminable.' 8 The certificate may be seen by the investor, but may
not sufficiently apprise him of the terms of his bargain; there is little
about the certificate to induce him to read it.
An unqualified description of the security in the certificate's title
as "convertible" discourages the holder from looking for qualifications
in the text. Furthermore, the design of the certificate distracts the
holder's attention from the text. Deterrence of forgers plays a large
part in the design of a certificate,' 9 and accordingly its most prominent
features are the margin, vignette, issuer's name, and title.20 The text
15 See McKinlay, Need for Legislative Control Over Public Debenture Borrowing,
1966 N.Z.L.J. 59.
16 Undoubtedly many losses are attributable to simple failure to see the notice of
redemption, the investor's knowledge notwithstanding. However, it is realistic to suppose
that many notices are missed because people do not know that they should look for them.
17 Hazzard v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 60, 287 N.Y.S. 541, 545 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
The trust indenture has been described as "a document that virtually no individual
investors, and surprisingly few institutional analysts, ever read." A. BLADEN, TECHNIQUES
FOR INvESTING IN CONVERTmIB. BONDS 14 (undated pamphlet, Salomon Bros. & Hutzler, New
York City).
18 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4890, Item 33 (Dec. 20, 1967) provides in part:
Where a prospectus relates to convertible securities which are subject to
redemption ... it should be stated at an appropriate place in the prospectus
that the right to convert . . . will be lost unless it is exercised before the
redemption ....
19 See NEW YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL § A12(11), at A-219 (1963),
Printing and Engraving Requirements, and A-220 (1963), Vignettes.
20 See, e.g., the convertible debenture reproduced in Specimens of Selected Securities
7, found in R. STEvENS & H. HENN, CASES ON COmOATONS (1965).
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may be printed in a small, heavily-leaded script l which is partially
obscured by a tint plate. Paragraphs may not be captioned or other-
wise made to stand out. Thus, although the text is visible as a whole,
it is neither conspicuous nor easily read.
In dealing with adhesion contracts, courts have recognized that "in
view of the disparate bargaining status of the parties we must ascertain
that meaning of the contract which [the weaker party] . . . would
reasonably expect." 22 Considering the importance of the right of con-
version, the holder's ignorance, and the issuer's failure to make con-
spicuous the provision that the right is terminable, the provision is
contrary to what the holder might reasonably expect. It should not be
enforced. Thus, a court should refuse to allow the issuer to carry out
a prospective termination or should award damages23 to a holder where
the issuer claims the right to convert is terminated. This enforcement
of the holder's reasonable expectations could deprive the issuer of all
power to terminate the conversion right. Arguably, this is a broader
result than any court would be willing to achieve, but it would serve
as a powerful impetus to the issuer to unequivocally apprise the pur-
chaser of the terms of his bargain. Discouraging misleading expres-
sions is an admitted goal of enforcing reasonable expectations in other
types of adhesion contracts.24
Courts have refused to enforce analogous insurance policy provi-
sions. For example, in Hessler v. Federal Casualty Co.25 a clause in fine
print limited the insurer's liability to twenty percent of the policy's
face value in case of death caused by intentional shooting. However,
larger print on the back of the policy stated that "[this policy] covers all
bodily injuries caused by accidental means, such as . . . gun shot
wounds .... " 26 The insured was shot by a robber, and the issue was
the amount of the company's liability. In holding the insurer liable for
the full face value of the policy, the court stressed the insured's reason-
able expectation based on the statement on the back of the policy and
the company's failure to warn him of the limitation on its liability:2 7
21 The New York Stock Exchange requires at least the promise to pay to be in script.
Nmv Yom STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL § A12(1), at A-217 (1966), Bonds in
Definitive Form, id. § A12(I1), at A-220 (1963).
22 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 270, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
107-08 (1966) (footnotes omitted). See Kessler, supra note 6, at 637.
23 See pp. 281-82 infra.
24 See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 879-84, 377 P.2d 284, 295-98,
27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 183-86 (1962).
25 190 Ind. 68, 129 N.E. 325 (1921).
26 Id. at 70, 129 N.E. at 325.
27 Although Hessler and the other cases discussed in the text ostensibly were deided
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- I]he unequivocal statement on the back of the policy, presented
j4 a manner to catch the eye of the insured, . .. expressly referred
to in the opening lines of the policy... forbids that a limitation
which purports to reduce the amount of liability... hidden away
in small type, . . . without further headline, . . shall receive a
construction that will defeat the recovery in this case of all but
twenty per cent. of the face of the policy.28
In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hiatt29 the issue was whether
double indemnity was payable when the insured died of gas inhalation.
The cover of the policy was stamped "'Double Indemnity for Fatal
Accident," but a clause on the fifth page provided that double indem-
nity was not payable if, among other things, death was caused by gas.
The court rejected the insurer's contention that the stamped phrase
was too brief to be given substantive effect 0 and held that double
indemnity was payable. It pointed out that the insurer could easily
have called insured's attention to the limitation81 and that a contrary
holding would not promote "fair speaking" in insurance policies.8 2
Mohan v. Union Fidelity Life Insurance Co. 8 8 dealt with the
benefits payable when the insured sustained compensable injury. An
endorsement to the policy stated in bold letters, "'PAYCHECK-PLUS'
SICKNESS AND ACCIDENT BENEFIT ENDORSEMENT." Al-
though the policy provided monthly benefits of two hundred dollars,
the court held the insurer liable for insured's monthly wages of $450,
noting that the policy was sold on a mass basis with little chance for
on grounds of cpnstruction and interpretation, a reading of the opinions 1akes clear that
the courts are actually enforcing the policy holders' reasonable expectations. "This
process of interpretation was used many years ago in interpreting (or construing) insurance
contracts." Patterson, supra note 7, at 858 (footnote omitted). See New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Hiatt, 140 F.2d 752, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1944); Hessler v. Federal Cas. Co., 190 Ind. 68, 76,
129 N,E, 325, 327 (1921); Mohan v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co,, $8 Pa, D, & C.2d 401,
410-lg (C.P. 1965), aff'd, 207 Pa. Super. 205, 216 A.2d 342, 347-48 (1966) (lower court opinion
reproduced in 216 A.2d 342).
28 Hessler v. Federal Cas. Co., 190 Ind. 68, 75, 129 N.E. 325, 327 (1921).
20 140 p-2d 752 (9th Cir, 1944).
8O Id. at 753. B ut see Kraus v. Lacede Gas Co., 354 S.W.2d $27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962),
where it was argued that an issuer of securities could not enforce redemption provisions
appearing In fine print when the security was captioned "4V% Fifteen Year Con-
vertible Sinking Fund Debentures." The court did not agree; it said that the caption was
only a general description and could not be thought to express the whole of the agree-
ment. No cases were cited. Cases like Hiatt, where the insurance policy was at least five
pages long, however, indicate that it is not necessary that the title purport to be the
whole of the agreement; it is enough that the title have implications which are not
adequately denied elsewhere.
31 140 F.2d at 753.
82 Id. at 754.
88 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 401 (C.P. 1965), aff'd, 207 Pa. Super. 205, 216 A.2d 342 (1966).
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negotiation8 4 and that the title was a powerful attraction to the pur-
chaser.3 5
These cases can furnish precedent for a refusal to enforce a clause
in a convertible security allowing the issuer to terminate the holder's
right of conversion before the issue's stated maturity. Both the issuer
and the insurer attempt, without adequate warning, to limit or qualify
rights which go to the heart of the bargain and Which their Security or
policy holders might reasonably expect to have.
Arguably, the problems are distinguishable because the disap-
pointed insured could easily have obtained the desired coverage, while
the investor cannot purchase a convertible security without redemption
provisionsm The policy holder is thus disappointed because he has
inadequate knowledge of his particular policy's coitents, whereas the
security holder is disappointed because he is ignorant of a feature
found in all convertible securities. Thus, because the contract did not
lead the holder astray, it may be pointless to apply to securities a remedy
intended to ptomote clear contractual statements of limitations on the
right to convert.31 However, this argument ignores the effect of industry
practice. The issuer discourages the holder from looking for qualifica-
tions by distributing convertible securities under titles which contain
the word "convertible" and by failing to provide anything which calls
the holder's attention to qualifications on the right to convert. The
34 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 410, 216 A42d at 347.
35 "The simple thotught is the plain thought that the policy Will pay the 'paycheck'."
Id. at 411, 216 A,2d at 348 (footnote omitted).
386 Kelly, supra note 2, at 292, col. 2.
37 The distinction and the argument are perhaps given weight by Mohn v. Unloh
Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 38 Pa. D, & 0.2d 401 (C.P. 1965), af'd, 207 Pa. Super., 205, 216
A.2d 342 (1966), discussing Continental Cas, Go. v. Ttenndt, 85 F, Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa.
1939). 11 Trenner one clause of an automobild isttrance policy was captioned "Automatic
Insurance for Newly Acquired Automobiles." The clause provided that there was no
coverage for liabilities incurted mote than ten days after the car was acquired unless
the company had been notified of the acquitition within ten days of the date of purchasd.
The district court rejected an argument based on the caption,.holding that theke Was
no coverage of an accident occurring more than ten days after the car was acquired where
the insured had not notified the company. The court in Mohan distinguished Trenher
on the ground, not mentioned by the district court, that "notice is a prime and not
uncommon requisite in an insurance policy." 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 407, 216 A.2d at 346.
Thus 'Mohan arguably standg for the proposition that reasonable expectatiOnS should be
enforced only when they are not contrary to an industry .practice. On the other hand,
Mohan may stand for enforcing expectationg only where they lxe reasonable, and, because
the need for notice is a matter of common knowledge, Trefilier s expettatiOns were not
reasonable. On this view, whether the holder's expectatidng s9Ould be enforced depends
on whether it is common knowledge that the conVersion-pfivilek-6-ji tdrminable. It is
urged herein that it is not common knowledge.
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contract and the manner of distribution may not engender the holder's
expectations, but they confirm them.
Insurance policies and convertible securities are both contracts
of adhesion. Protection of the weaker party and recognition of a
public interest in insurance are reasons which have motivated the
courts to afford special treatment to insurance policies.38 Similar rea-
sons are equally compelling in the area of securities; the holder of
a convertible security is in no better bargaining position than the
holder of an insurance policy, and the public interest in securities is
evidenced by extensive regulation of that field.39 If the insurer must
make dear to his insured any limitations on coverage, the issuer of
convertible securities should similarly apprise the holders of any limita-
tions on.the right of conversion.
B. Notification Procedures: Refusing to Enforce an Unconscionable
Bargain
The usual procedure for notifying holders of coupon bonds of an
impending redemption is publication of a notice once a week for four
weeks in a New York City newspaper.40 The time when the first pub-
lication must be made varies from thirty to sixty days before the
redemption date.41 Holders of registered securities, on the other hand,
are usually notified by mail,42 but the indenture may provide that if
notice is also given by publication, "neither failure to give notice by
mail, nor defect in any notice so mailed, shall affect the validity of
the proceedings for such redemption." 4 Similar provision may be made
38 See Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1962); Kessler, supra note 6, at 633, 635.
39 Arguably, because he needs insurance but does not need to invest, the individual
should be protected in the purchase of insurance but not in the purchase of securities.
But a capitalistic economy requires investment, and protection of the individual en-
courages investment.
40 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION CoRPoRATE DEBT FINANCING PROJECT, MODEL
DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS § 1105 (1965); R. MCCLELLAND & F. FisHn, JR., THE
LAw oF CORPORATE MORTGAGE BOND ISSUES 543 (1937); Specimens of Selected Securities,
supra note 20, at 7. A newspaper published in.another city is sometimes used as well. See,
e.g., Kraus v. Laclede Gas Co., 354 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); AMEICAN BAR FOUNDA-
TION CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING PROJECT, supra.
41 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING PROJECT, supra note 40,
§ 1105; McCLELLAND & FtsEs, supra note 40, at 543; Specimens of Selected -Securities,
supra note 20, at 7.
42 Issuers do not always make use of this opportunity. A registered security may
provide that notice by either publication or mail is sufficient. See, e.g., Specimens of
Selected Securities, supra note 20, at 7.
43 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING PROJECT, supra note 40,
§ 1105.
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for failure to comply exactly with the publication requirements. 44
Finally, the notice published or mailed to the holder may not mention
that the right to convert is terminated by redemption.45
With the exception of notifying the holder by mail, these proce-
dures entail a high probability that a holder will not be notified. For
this reason, the procedures should be deemed unconscionable. 46 Inclu-
44 See McCLELLND & FISHER, supra note 40, at 543 n.
45 The American Bar Foundation's 1965 model indenture provisions had no require-
ment that notices of redemption include a statement that redemption terminates the right
to convert; the 1967 version does have this requirement. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION
CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING PnojEcr, SAMPLE INCORPORATING INDENTURE art. 13(6) (1967).
There may be notice requirements in addition to those in the indenture. See, e.g.,
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL § A10 (1967), which requires that news
of corporate action looking towards redemption be released to a New York City newspaper,
Dow Jones, and a major wire service. A general news release, rather than a formal advertise-
ment, satisfies this requirement, and repeated publication is not necessary. These require-
ments do not significantly improve the quality of notice given the holder.
46 The classic definition of "unconscionable bargain" is that given in Earl of Chester-
field v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch. 1751): "[Bargains] such as no man in his senses
and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other. . .are unequitable and unconscientious .... Id. at 100. This
definition was adopted in Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889), and in Greer
v. Tweed, 13 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 427, 429-30 (N.Y.C.P. 1872). In Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furn. Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court set up the following standard:
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Whether a meaningful
choice is present in a particular case can only be determined by consideration of
all the circumstances surrounding the transaction. In many cases the meaningful-
ness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. The
manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this consideration.
Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it,
have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were
the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive
sales practices?
Id. at 449 (footnotes omitted).
The power of American courts to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract pro-
vision has been expressly recognized by both statute and case law. See Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furn. Co., supra; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302. When applied to adhesion contracts, the
power has been rationalized as a necessary response to situations where there is no mean-
ingful choice. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra; see Patterson, supra note
7, at 855-58. The prospective purchaser cannot find a convertible security without pro-
visions for redemption. Kelly, supra note 2, at 292, col. 2. However, he does have an initial
choice whether to invest at all. He has a secondary choice whether to buy a coupon or a
registered issue, which is in effect a limited choice of notice provisions. His position is
therefore not the same as that described in Henningsen, where the court found that the
purchaser of an automobile had no real choice as to warranties because all manufacturers
used the same warranty and because, as a practical matter, the purchaser had to have a
car. 32 N.J. at 386-87, 390, 161 A.2d at 85, 87. However, courts may also find a form
contract clause to be unconscionable where the contract is for the sale of a non-essential
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sion of a conversion feature in a security works to the issuer's advan-
tage,47 since convertibility makes salable an issue which would not other-
wise be so 48 and gives any issue appeal to a broader cross-section of
investors than it would otherwise have.49 The issuer of a convertible
borrows money at a lower rate of interest than a straight bond or
debenture would require and, if conversion is made, in effect sells
stock at a higher price than was obtainable at the time the convertible
was issued. It is unfair for the issuer to use the conversion right to its
own advantage, and then to withdraw that right in such a way that a
holder is unlikely to receive any warning and, hence, is unlikely to
benefit from the right,
It is questionable how many convertible securities would be
bought if potential purchasers were aware of the likelihood of not
receiving notice of a redemption. A holder who does not receive
notice is left, on balance, with the disadvantages of his bargain. He
receives interest (although at a lower rate than he could have had with-
out the right to convert), the redemption premium, and repayment
of principal, but he loses the stock into which his holdings are con-
vertible and its value, which is likely to be considerably greater than
the value of what he retains. 50 Here there is not the double wrong of,
say, an exorbitant profit,51 but the lack of unjust benefit to the issuer
does not mitigate the harm done to the holder. Of course, as long as
bearer or unregistered securities are issued, no procedure can guar-
antee that every holder will be notified. But improved procedures
could be adopted. For etample, publication could be made more fre-
quently in a greater number of papers. These papers could be specified
by name, rather than by city of publication and could be selected so
that in any part of the country at least one would be easily available.
Rather than providing simply that publication will be made sometime
during the week, the day could be specified. Furthermore, since redemp-
tion dates are usually made to coincide with interest dates, thereby
and where there is no suggestioi that better terms are not available elsewhere. Williatnt v.
Walker-Thoma Fturn. CO., supr.
Because a plea of unconsdonability could be made only after the right to converf had
been terminated, and then only by a holder who did not in fact receive notice, this theory
has a narrower effect than does enforcement of the holder's reasonable expectations.
See pp. 275-78 supra.
47 1 DEWING, supj'a note 8, at 271.
48 GiT-MANN 9c DOUGALL, Supra note 8, at 146.
49 1 DEwiNG, supra note 8, at 271.
50 See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
51 See, e.g., American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MadVer, 105 N.I. 435, 201 A.2d
886 (1964). Indeed, the holder's failute td convert appears contrary to what the issuer
wants; see note 55 and accompanying text infra.
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avoiding bookkeeping problems,02 a requirement that notice be pub-
lished on, as an example, the four Mondays immediately preceding the
redemption date would not unduly restrict the issuer's discretion.
Certainly any notice given should make dear that the right of conver-
sion is about to be terminated.
Arguably, no method of publication will notify substantially more
investors than are reached under existing procedures. If so, the issuer's
failure to improve its publication practice is no basis for holding
present procedures unconscionable. 53 But if the issuer can provide a
practicable substitute for publication and does not do so, its continuing
use of publication does provide such a basis. A substitute is available;
the issuer can either solicit addresses to which notices could be mailed
or, as is sometimes done, give the holder the option of registering his
bond.
These suggested procedures would increase the probability that a
holder would receive notice of redemption, yet would place only a
relatively light burden on the issuer. Even the expense of publishing
more often in more newspapers is slight in comparison with the losses
currently sustained by investors. Compared to the suggested proce-
dures, existing procedures seem careless of the holder's rights. Indeed,
the provisions regarding notice given without strict compliance with
the indenture's terms suggest that present procedures are designed
not so much to notify the holder as to present as few barriers as possible
to an effective redemption when the issuer wants to redeem. Consider-
ing the importance of the right of conversion to the holder, the issuer
drives too hard a bargain in the matter of notice.
C, Damages
Were a court to hold either that the reasonable expectations of
the holder cannot be disappointed without a more conspicuous warning
or that the provisions for giving notice are so unsatisfactory in the
52 Mendes, supra note 3, at 442, col. 3.
63 There is an obvious analogy to notice by publication in legal actions. Arguably,
thq notice provisions in the indenture should not be held unconscionable unless they are
markedly inferior to typical statutory requirements. This is not generally the case; see,
e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 316(a) (McKinney 1963). However, notice by publication has
fallen into disfavor; see F. JAms, JR., CIVIL PRocEDURE § 12.11, at 652-53 (1965). In some
situations where such notice is permissible, it is expected that the person to be notified
will receive notice as a result of some other action, such as attachment or garnishment.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950). In others "it is not
reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning." Id. at 317. Neither
of these situations exists in the case of convertible securities; there is nothing to notify
the holder except the notice given, and the issuer could easily provide a means of notice
better calculated to reach the investor.
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circumstances as to be unconscionable, the issuer's refusal to convert
after the redemption day would be wrongful. Since the stock is prob-
ably not unique and since the issuer's refusal to convert works no
irreparable harm to the holder, specific performance is probably not
available. What damages, then, should the holder be awarded?
One court has suggested that, failing a proper exercise of the
power to redeem, the rights between issuer and holder continue as
before. 54 This implies that the proper measure of damages is the value,
at the time of refusal, of the stock into which the security is convertible.
Unless the value of the stock is then the same as on the last day the
issuer allowed conversion, however, this measure is unsatisfactory.
If the stock has appreciated since the redemption day, the holder
is elevated above those holders who converted within the time allowed
and have since sold the stock. Furthermore, litigation is encouraged
by making it profitable to wait and challenge the redemption. Argu-
ably, the holders who converted could have retained the stock and
enjoyed the fruits of its appreciation, but the holder who successfully
presents his claim in court had, while he waited, the security of a fixed
claim against the issuer which the other holders lacked. Vis4-vis the
issuer, the holder is entitled to compensation, but he should not be
put in a position superior to that of other holders.
If the stock has depreciated since the last day for conversion, a
measure of damages giving the holder the lesser value in effect punishes
him for an omission which is either reasonable or the result of un-
satisfactory notice procedures. Again, of course, a holder who converted
before the end of the conversion period might have retained the stock
and suffered the same loss; but he was aware of the absence of any
fixed claim against the issuer and made a conscious decision to retain
the stock, whereas the holder who thought he had a claim had no such
opportunity.
The best approach is to award the holder the market value of the
stock on the last day of the conversion period. If the stock has appre-
ciated since that time he is denied the increased value. But since he
avoided the investment risk undertaken by holders who converted and
retained the stock, he can fairly be denied the additional amount.
II
NON-LEGAL REMEDIES: ENTERPRISE REFORM
Failure to notify investors creates ill will and loss of faith in invest-
ment generally; furthermore, it frustrates the issuer's attempt to force
54 Mueller v. Howard Aircraft Corp., 329 IM. App. 570, 578, 70 N.E.2d 203, 207 (1946).
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conversion so as to avoid a drain on his funds.55 A better system should
be devised. Legal enforcement of a holder's conversion right after
redemption could probably be prevented by simple changes in the draft-
ing and appearance of convertible securities. Although such changes
are desirable, they will not eliminate the problem. No system depend-
ing on notice to the investor can insure a complete absence of losses.
Although the industry recognizes that a problem exists, it appar-
ently feels that the loss is either too insignificant to merit change or
the result of carelessness on the investor's part and hence not susceptible
to cure. 6 A $1,700,000 loss 57 is significant, however, in individual if
not in corporate terms, and investor carelessness in this regard is a
problem only if the investor is required to be alert. There may be
satisfactory alternatives which do not make such demands on the
investor.
Adoption of some or all of the suggested changes in notification
procedures would be an improvement, but it would not help the
investor who does not realize that the issuer may try to reach him.
Issuing all convertible securities in registered form would allow all
holders to be reached by mail. But despite a movement in favor of
registered bonds,5  technological improvements in the handling of
coupons and objections based on the delay inherent in the transfer of
registered securities make a complete changeover unlikely.59 Holders
of coupon bonds could be invited to send the issuer an address to
which notices would be sent; again, however, the problem of how to
inform the unwary investor of this opportunity remains.
A more positive solution is to give the trustee authorization in
the indenture to requisition and sell, at the close of the conversion
55 BLADEN, supra note 17, at 14; Kelly,, supra note 2, at 292, col. 2. In theory, the issuer
will redeem only when the market price of the stock is sufficiently greater than the con-
version price to make conversion the holders' only reasonable alternative. If the difference
between the market price of the stock and the redemption price is small enough to cause
doubt whether nearly all holders will convert rather than redeem, it is standard practice
to enter into a standby agreement with underwriters. The issuer pays the underwriter to
offer to buy, at a premium over the redemption price, those securities which holders
choose not to convert. The underwriter then converts the securities.
56 One authority on convertible securities says, somewhat incredulously, "In spite of
the wide publicity that corporations give to convertible bond calls, thousands of investors
every year fail to convert or tender their bonds. Don't let this happen to youl" BLADEN,
supra note 17, at 12.
57 Note 1 and accompanying text supra.
58 See, e.g., Ely, The Campaign for Registered Bonds, PUB. UTiL. FoRTNIGHTLY, April
25, 1963, at 46; Johnson, Toward a More Widespread Use of Registered Bonds, 198 COM.
& FIN. CHRON., July 11, 1963, § 2, at 11.
59 Waldbillig, Coupon Bonds Still Preferred to Registered by Many Investors, 199
Co. & FIN. CHRON. 1013 (1964). Agnew, Solving Bond Coupon Problem, 198 CoM. & Fm.
QHaON., July 11, 1965, § 2, at 10.
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period, a number of shares equal to the number for which debentures
still outstanding could have been exchanged. 60 The sale would be
made only if its net proceeds were greater than the redemption price
of the still outstanding securities. A holder of unredeemed or uncon-
verted debentures would then receive his pro rata share of the net
proceeds, rather than the redemption price. This solution sidesteps
completely the problem of the careless and the unreachable investor.
The utility of the trustee's sale is not limited to future convertible
issues, for the issuer and the trustee of an existing issue could enter
into an agreement adopting this method. There would be little dif-
ficulty in making such an agreement; since the holders would benefit,
their consent would probably be unnecessary. 61 Arguably, however,
making the agreement would breach management's duty to obtain at
least a reasonable price for corporate assets. 62 The trustee could sell the
shares in such a way as to obtain their market value for the company;
instead, he sells them and holds the proceeds for the security holders,
thereby obtaining only the conversion price. Thus, the agreement may
waste corporate assets. However, the trufstee's sale is distinguishable
from the ordinary sale of corporate property in that the shares involved
are exclusively those to which the security holders had a prior claim.
The sale merely insures that the security holders will benefit from their
right to convert.
Although the shares are sold after the expiration of the holder's
claim to them, the issuer is under no obligation to terminate conversion
rights at a specified time; the conversion period could extend until the
issues' maturity date. Thus, the relationship between the time of the
sale and the end of the conversion period should be irrelevant. Further-
more, insofar as the agreement adopting the trustee's sale forestalls
litigation of either the validity of terminating the right to convert or
the adequacy of notice, it is a valid exercise of management's power to
settle disputed claims.53
09 An additional statutory exemption from the registration requirements of the
Securties Act of 1933, 15 U.5.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964), would be required. There is no reason
to think the SEC Would not be in accord with this exemption.
61 Indentures commonly provide that modifications for the benefit of the holders
can be made without their consent. See, e.g., Am1EmCAN BAR FONDATION CORPORATE DEBT
FINANCING PROJECT, supra note 40, § 901(2); 3A FLETCHmR CoRPORATIoN Foams ANNOTATED
§ 2853.1, at 223 (rev. 3d ed. 1958); McCLELAND & FISHER, supra note 40, at 818. Such
modifications could also be made without any express authority in the indenture. J.
KENNEDY, CORPORATE TRu4T ADMINISTRMTION 222 (1961),
62 Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (ED. Pa. 19 5); Schmid v, Lancaster
Ave. Theatre Co., 244 Pa, 373, 91 A. 363 (1914).
63 Levine, v. Behn, 174 Misc, 98, 21 N.Y.S.24 805 (Sup. Ct, 1949), aff'd, 262 App. Div.
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The method of the trustee's sale might be generally attacked on
the ground that under it only a few invegtors would convert, most
choosing to await the proceeds of the sale. The simple failure to con-
vert would not, however, harm the issuer, since it would produce no
drain on the issuer's funds. The only difficulty arising from wholesale
nonconversion would be that the large sale by the trustee would
realize much less than could be obtained under the present system,
thereby reducing the relative attractiveness of convertible debentures.
But it is not clear why the new system would produce an increased
number of failures to convert. Holders who wanted the stock, rather
than its proceeds, would still convert; even holders who intended
to sell the stock would surely convert rather than take their chances
in the sale. In most cases, then, investor behavior would follow its
present pattern. The crucial difference would be that holders who are
unaware of the redemption would be spared most of the loss they now
suffer.
David P. Lampkin
729, 28 N.YS.2d 711 (lst Dep't i941); Hurley v. Ornsteen, 311 Mass. 477, 42 N.E.24 218
(1942).
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